A preliminary report from the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs has revealed multiple failures by the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) in its handling of the July 13 assassination attempt on former President Donald Trump during a rally in Butler, Pennsylvania.

The attack left one spectator dead, two seriously wounded, and Trump himself struck on the ear.

The report, released Wednesday, outlines significant lapses in planning, communication, and coordination between federal and local law enforcement, contributing to the dangerous breach in security.

Celebrate Trump's Historic 2024 Victory with the Exclusive Trump 47th President Collection!

The report highlights how a combination of preventable errors allowed 20-year-old suspect Matthew Thomas Crooks to carry out the attempt on Trump’s life.

Among the issues identified was the denial of requests for additional resources, such as unmanned drones and more personnel.

One Secret Service agent, with only an hour of informal drone training, was forced to call a toll-free tech support hotline after experiencing difficulties with equipment on-site.

These failures led to the Secret Service being unable to use their drone until after Crooks had launched his own near the rally.

“Multiple foreseeable and preventable planning and operational failures by USSS contributed to Crooks’ ability to carry out the assassination attempt of former President Trump on July 13,” the report states. “These included unclear roles and responsibilities, insufficient coordination with state and local law enforcement, the lack of effective communications, and inoperable counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS).”

Testimonies from agents on Trump’s detail, as well as the Pittsburgh field office, indicate that neither were aware of the threat when, 27 minutes before the shooting, local authorities spotted a suspicious person near the AGR building with a range finder.

The building, across the field from where Trump was speaking, later became the position from which Crooks opened fire.

Despite the suspicious activity being reported to the Secret Service’s security room and counter-sniper team, no action was taken to remove Trump from the stage.

According to the report, a Secret Service counter-sniper witnessed local law enforcement running toward the AGR building with guns drawn but failed to alert Trump’s protective detail. “While seeing officers with their guns drawn ‘elevated’ the threat level,” the counter-sniper later testified, “the thought to notify someone to get Trump off the stage ‘did not cross [his] mind.’”

In an unusual move, Secret Service counter-snipers were deployed at the rally due to credible intelligence of a potential threat.

The presence of counter-snipers was not standard practice for candidates not yet formally nominated by their party, as the Republican National Convention was set to take place two days after the shooting.

In the days leading up to the event, local law enforcement had raised concerns about the AGR building, but its rooftop remained unsecured.

Agents on Trump’s detail had requested additional resources, including more drone equipment and counter-assault agents to work with local SWAT teams.

These requests were denied, often without explanation, the committee found.

Technical failures also hampered the Secret Service’s response. Communication issues, including malfunctioning radios, delayed the flow of vital information.

The special agent in charge of the Pittsburgh field office was without a radio, having handed it to another agent on Trump’s advance team, further complicating the ability to respond to the threat.

Another significant issue was the lack of a clear chain of command.

The committee found that officials responsible for planning and security failed to take responsibility for the lapses, instead deflecting blame. “I don’t approve anything,” one lead advance agent told senators. “I clearly just take the information that they [other agents] have recommended and put together with the other information that’s put together from the other advance entities.”

This confusion contributed to delays in addressing the threat.

The committee has recommended establishing clearer leadership structures, designating a single person to approve security plans, improving communication between federal and local law enforcement, and ensuring the allocation of necessary resources for such events.

Local law enforcement officers inside the AGR building were assigned to protect the crowd, not secure the roof.

Though the building’s rooftop was a clear vantage point for a sniper, officers were not tasked with scanning potential threats from that location.

The officers, designated as “snipers,” were responsible for crowd surveillance rather than “counter-snipers,” whose role is to identify and neutralize threats from elevated positions.

Following the attack, Crooks was shot and killed by a Secret Service counter-sniper.

The July 13 incident marked the first of two attempts on Trump’s life over the summer.

The second occurred on September 15, 2024, when 58-year-old Ryan Routh was arrested near Trump International Golf Club in West Palm Beach, Florida.

A Secret Service agent spotted Routh pointing a rifle at Trump from a tree line as the former president played golf.

Routh was taken into custody without further incident.

The Senate committee’s report sheds light on numerous areas for improvement in Secret Service protocols, including better coordination between agencies, enhanced intelligence gathering, and clearer leadership roles.

The report is expected to guide future adjustments to ensure that security for high-profile figures is more robust and responsive to potential threats.

The Secret Service has yet to issue a formal response to the findings.

The opinions expressed by contributors and/or content partners are their own and do not necessarily reflect the views of LifeZette. Contact us for guidelines on submitting your own commentary.