Fallacy of TPP’s National Security Promise

As President Obama plans a final drive to pass the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), his own administration has placed a massive obstacle in the way. In recent weeks, top aides have told journalists Obama is considering new U.S. nuclear weapons policies that would torpedo his claims that the politically troubled trade agreement is needed to enhance American national security.

In addition to touting the 12-country deal’s economic upside for America, the president has described it as a dual geopolitical boon. First, he maintains, the TPP will counter China’s rising trade and investment profile in East Asia, an economically dynamic region central to America’s prosperity. Second, Obama contends, the agreement will reaffirm for concerned regional allies the U.S. commitment to their defense in the face of growing Chinese expansionism.

The contention that the TPP will help ensure business in Asia is governed by U.S.-style commercial rules is hardly bullet-proof.

The contention that the TPP will help ensure business in Asia is governed by U.S.-style commercial rules is hardly bullet-proof. After all, few East Asian economies structurally resemble America’s — whether in terms of government-business relationships, regulatory philosophies, or consumer versus producer orientation. Moreover, although the TPP has been depicted as a vitally important alternative to trade agreements being pushed by Beijing, even the Obama administration has decided to work with China indirectly through the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

But at least the TPP can reasonably be portrayed as a new — if not game-changing — opportunity for Washington to exercise influence. By contrast, the idea of the TPP as a symbol of American reliability has been completely undercut by Obama’s strong interest in reversing decades of U.S. strategic doctrine, and declaring that America will never be the first nation to use nuclear weapons in a conflict.

Whatever its other merits, an American adoption of “no first use” would inevitably — and understandably — shred the credibility of its defense guarantees to treaty allies Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. Countries with less comprehensive arrangements with Washington will doubtless become even more nervous.

The reason is simple: For decades, Washington and the treaty allies in particular have regarded American nuclear weapons as great equalizers. They could deter China and North Korea — along with the Soviet Union during the Cold War — without the enormous expense of fielding conventional forces comparable to the huge non-nuclear militaries their rivals could bring to bear on fronts far from the U.S. homeland.

Nuclear weapons were also thought to hold more promise of preventing war than large conventional forces. After all, their use threatened to turn even attacks planned to be limited in objective and therefore scope into suicidal risks.

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That’s why reports of allied complaints about this possible Obama move are so believable. If adversaries like China in the South China Sea or North Korea on the Korean peninsula knew that American nuclear weapons would be held at bay, they might be more likely to use their superior non-unclear forces to bring major victories.

These same reports indicate the president has not yet decided to switch to no first use. But these apparent trial balloons can’t help but reinforce the qualms about American reliability that are already growing throughout East Asia. After all, U.S. nuclear guarantees looked especially impressive when the United States enjoyed a nuclear weapons monopoly or significant superiority. Those days, however, are long gone — China and North Korea have made significant strides toward developing nuclear deterrents of their own.

In other words, even a highly effective U.S. strike on their nuclear forces could leave them with nuclear missiles that can reach American shores. The resulting doubts that any American president really would risk Los Angeles or Chicago to save Seoul or Tokyo have led both South Korea and Japan to look at going nuclear themselves.

A no first use strategy could make eminent sense for a United States determined to reduce nuclear risks to its homeland by scaling back alliance commitments. But it makes no sense for leaders who, like President Obama, have supported these arrangements — even to the point of dismissing Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump as ignorant for even suggesting a rethink. Still less defensible is the president’s apparent belief that a new trade deal will calm Asian nerves — sure to remain jangled even if he reaffirms nuclear current policy.

President Obama clearly hasn’t made the economic case for the TPP. That’s why he’s decided to postpone any possible vote on the deal until a lame-duck session of Congress, after this year’s elections. Unless he clarifies his confusing Asia military strategy record, he’ll deservedly struggle to make the national security case as well.

Alan Tonelson, who writes on economic and security policy at RealityChek, is the author of “The Race to the Bottom” (Westview Press, 2002).